The documents in this collection also demonstrate the symbiotic relationship between policy and promotion that dominates our perception of world affairs. When the information provided by intelligence agencies, including the CIA, was insufficiently compelling the administration obtained the evidence it sought from alternative sources. Bush administration was resolved to invade Iraq, sought evidence that could be used to justify doing so, and found ways of obtaining it. Information in the collection will also be useful in examining an issue of continuing concern: the politicization of intelligence to serve political ends. Epitomizing its historical significance is the fact that the invasion of Iraq is often characterized as the worst foreign policy mistake in modern American history, one that produced long-term catastrophic consequences for Iraq and for the United States and contributed greatly to the seemingly endless regional instability and cycle of violence that followed. The primary value of this collection is as a detailed record of the lead-up to, and initial phases of, the Iraq war, one of the most consequential events of recent history-for the United States, for Iraq, for the Middle East, and for the international community. Materials in the set can be used to compare raw and unconfirmed intelligence information reports, finished analyses, and documents that were prepared for public consumption, as the White House sought partners for the regime-change policy it had elected to pursue. allegations that Iraq had active chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons programs, and that Saddam Hussein was operationally linked to global terrorists, including the militant Islamist leader Osama bin Laden.Īlso available within the collection are examples of assessments championing these claims, and contradictory analyses arguing that the allegations were not confirmed by available evidence. Included are examples of the intelligence reporting that underlay U.S. The collection includes documents from the State and Defense Departments reflecting debates within both the Clinton and the Bush administrations about how best to achieve American objectives in Iraq, and discussions from the Bush presidency about tactics for winning congressional, United Nations, foreign, and domestic support for the United States’ decision to invade Iraq. The latter ended during the summer of 2004, when Iraqis technically regained their sovereignty and the Coalition Provisional Authority, set up by the U.S. Included is material from President Bill Clinton’s second term, when the overthrow of Iraq’s president, Saddam Hussein, became official United States policy, documents covering the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and information on the 18 months of direct U.S. policy toward Iraq from 1997 through mid-2004. This is a collection of 2,141 records, many only recently declassified, documenting U.S. Targeting Iraq, Part 1: Planning, Invasion, and Occupation, 1997-2004